IFin Seminar, Nadya Malenko, Boston College - "Voting Choice"
Istituto di finanza
Data: 3 marzo 2025 / 12:25 - 13:40
Speaker: Nadya Malenko - Boston College
Title: "Voting Choice"
Date: March 3, 2025
Ore: 12:25 - 13:40
Room: Red Room - Executive Center
Lugano West Campus
Abstract
Traditionally, fund managers cast votes on behalf of investors whose capital they manage. Recently, this system has come under intense debate given the growing concentration of voting power among a few asset managers and disagreements over environmental and social issues, leading to a shift towards "pass-through voting." Major fund managers now offer their investors a choice: delegate their votes to the fund or cast votes themselves ("voting choice"). This paper develops a theory of delegation of voting rights and studies the implications of voting choice for investor welfare. If voting choice is offered because investors have heterogeneous preferences, then investors may retain their voting rights excessively, inefficiently prioritizing their private preferences over information. As a result, investors on aggregate are not always better off if voting choice is offered to them. In contrast, if voting choice is offered to aggregate investors' heterogeneous information, then voting choice is generally efficient, increasing investor welfare. However, if information collection is costly, voting choice may lead to coordination failure, resulting in less informed voting outcomes.